The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state's membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court's power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter's derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the "great accession" of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become "only ones of many" national courts.
Introduction
The centralized model of constitutional review was created in political and systemic conditions that were distinctly different from those that characterize contemporary Europe. 1 The development of the integration process, moving towards an ever closer, not only economic, but also political cooperation, combined with the creation of the supranational legal system characteristic of the EU, inevitably had to influence the constitutional courts. The aim of this article is to identify the most significant changes related to the impact of EU law on the constitutional courts of the Member States and to attempt to conceptualize them. 2 The typological features of Kelsen's model of monitoring the constitutionality of the law are as follows:
• the assumption of a hierarchical structure of the legal system; • the assumption of the superior legal force of the constitution as the most important normative act of a given system; • a centralized model of hierarchical control of the conformity of norms (granting exclusive competence in this respect to the constitutional court); • coherence of the system guaranteed by the determination of the defectiveness of a norm by the constitutional court and its derogation from the legal system.
The jurisprudence of the constitutional courts of the Member States shows that European integration has had a fundamental impact on each of these elements. 3 First of all, significant modification was implemented with regard to the tier structure of the legal system. The establishment of the EU legal system, the elements of which may be directly applicable before national standards, with priority over them (in relation to their application, not enforceability) has necessitated a significant reinterpretation of the concept of the legal system. Nowadays, the basic term describing the legal system functioning throughout the EU (understood as a combination of the EU law and the legal systems of the Member States) is legal pluralism. Its meaning is conceptually linked to:
• the multicentricity of legal systems (both in terms of legislation and application of the law); • multi-level constitutionalism (including both national constitutionalism and European constitutionalism); • the heterarchy of the legal system. 4
The heterarchy of the legal system is particularly important for the analysis of the impact of the integration process on the classic (Kelsenian) paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law. It can be said that the assumption of the hierarchical structure of the legal system has fundamentally changed. From the classically understood hierarchicality, the legal system of Europe has evolved to the undisputed heterarchicality (at least in the descriptive and not normative sense).
The heterarchy of the legal systems that make up the legal order of the whole EU changes in turn the second element of the classic paradigm, namely the unquestionable and unconditional dogma of the superior power of the Constitution, as the most important normative act in the state. This dogma was undermined by the ECJ as early as in 1964 in the ruling in the case Costa v. E.N.E.L., as subsequently confirmed by the ECJ in 1970 in the judgment in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case. Since that moment, a discussion on the role of national constitutions in the EU legal system has been held. Constitutional courts have come a long way from complete rejection of the thesis on the primacy (of application) of EU law over constitutional norms, to its conditional or partial acceptance. 5 This does not mean, however, that the supremacy of the Constitution is a concept that has lost its meaning in contemporary Europe. It has undoubtedly been subject to a certain reinterpretation and has lost its ruthless character, but it remains an element legitimising constitutional courts to monitor the constitutionality of EU law.
The third element of the analysed paradigm of constitutional jurisdiction in the form of the assumption of centralized control of the hierarchical conformity of norms has also been affected. The so-called Community mandate granted to all national courts in the Simmenthal II judgment to a significant extent decentralized the broadly understood control of constitutionality. 6 Currently, each court, when determining the legal basis for its decisions, is obliged to assess the compatibility of national law with EU law and, in the case of the impossibility of eliminating possible conflicts through the so-called interpretation in accordance with EU law, is obliged to refuse to apply a national rule and to issue a decision on the basis of a directly applicable provision of EU law. Whilst the stirring of the dogma of constitutional supremacy has led to direct confrontation of constitutional courts with the position of the CJEU, the decentralization of the control of norms creates conflicts of competence and ambition between the constitutional courts and other supreme judicial authorities of a given Member State. The posi-5 For general overviews on the issue, see SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie, STONE SWEET, Alec, WEILER, Joseph Halevi Horowitz (eds). tion of constitutional courts as the ultimate interpreter and legitimate guardian of the Constitution is therefore sometimes challenged by the highest courts or the supreme administrative courts.
The decentralization of the control of standards in the model presented by the CJEU in the Simmenthal II ruling changes the last of the key elements of the Kelsenian paradigm of constitutional judicature. It is a theoretical-legal concept of the effects of a judgment on unconstitutionality, which is connected with the idea of eliminating a defective standard from the legal system. In classical terms, the effect of a ruling of a constitutional court (omitting the temporal dimension) is of an erga omnes nature, and thus refers to the entire legal system, and not only to an individual legal situation being the background to a case decided by a constitutional court. The primacy of the application of EU law over national rules, in conjunction with the Community mandate of national courts, gives rise to a situation in which the control of national law rules as compared with EU law can, and most often does, have an inter partes effect. The adjudicating court adopts the conclusion that the national rule is incompatible with EU law in the case before it and applies the latter. At the same time, however, the national standard still remains in the legal system, and may moreover still be applied by other courts in situations not covered by EU law. The question of the nature of a national court's decision on incompatibility with other national courts adjudicating in similar cases (with the European context) depends on the rank of the court which issues the first ruling. However, it is not possible to apply here the notion of a de iure precedent: such a judgment can at most be attributed the value of a de facto precedent. 7
Later in this article, the changes to the model attributes of the classical paradigm of constitutional judicature indicated above will be subject to an in-depth analysis.
Constitutional courts and the constitutional heterarchy of the EU's modern legal system
The first use of the term 'heterarchy' in the description of the relationship between Member States' legal systems and EU law is attributed to N. Walker This word comes from the Greek language and is a combination of two words: heteros (other, different) and archē (which in turn means sovereignty). While hierarchical constitutional structures assume a vertical or a horizontal structure of competences, with a single most important centre of authority existing in a given area of competence, and are based on the assumption of traditionally understood sovereignty, the concept of heterarchy can be used to describe a relatively new and qualitatively different type of sovereignty or power, the emergence of which is observed within the European constitutional structures. 9
Constitutional heterarchy signifies a system of spontaneous, decentralized establishment of relations between the various legal entities that make up the whole system. According to D. Halberstam, constitutional heterarchy cannot however be reduced only to the question of solving conflicts of competence in a way characterized by random and individual determination of the dominance and thus the attribution to the more important organ of one of the elements of the system. This would mean only a relative advantage of one entity over another, which, in another systemic context, could be redirected to another entity. In fact, the constitutional heterarchy is based on the theoretical assumption that the coordination of relations between the various actors of the legal system is carried out on the basis of axiological judgments which relate to the values of constitutionalism itself. This concept assumes that the very establishment of competence relations between the actors of the system in the way described above leads to the crystallization of what the fundamental values of constitutionalism are. 10 Halberstam points out that in the heterarchic structure, the actors of the legal system will base the theses of the superiority of their power within the legal structure on the relative possibility of invoking the values of constitutionalism. Even if such a thesis seems to be a pure bidding for the power of a given entity, its claims will be formulated in the form of a constitutional principle. In other words, such normative and interpretative conflicts will be dealt with in the so-called "constitutional register", using the expression of Neil Walker. 11 Entering Walker's "constitutional register" entails the exercise of power within the constitutional structure, i.e. governing in accordance with certain assumptions adopted earlier. 12 In this context, it should be stated that the pre-source of changes in Kelsen's paradigm of controlling the constitutionality of law is European constitutionalism. As early as in the Van Gend judgment, the ECJ consciously entered the above-mentioned "constitutional register". This ruling can also be considered as the beginning of the end of the Kelsen era in Europe.
The current constitutional landscape of Europe long ago ceased to resemble a collection of isolated constitutional systems of national states and has gradually evolved into a multi-level relationship between national systems, the EU legal system, as well as other legal systems claiming the right to be viewed from a constitutional perspective (e.g. the ECHR with its additional protocols and the ECtHR as the final interpreter of its provisions). The constitutional language is widely used in textbooks on EU law, and despite the failure of the idea of the Constitutional Treaty, the post-Lisbon normative state is described as evidence of the progressive constitutionalization of the EU.
It can be said that European constitutionalism (EU constitutionalism) was a prerequisite for the transition from a hierarchical to a heterarchical legal system. The second element allowing for the emergence of a heterarchy is the pluralism of legal orders, which is manifested by the multiplicity of claims for the status of the highest authority. 13 Legal pluralism, however, implies a lack of pursuit towards the settlement of these disputed claims and the establishment of a jurisdictional order, whilst, on the contrary, it involves the accommodation of relations between the various institutions and systems with simultaneous lack of the establishment of hierarchical structures. 14 As noted by Merita Huomo-Kettunen, the concept of heterarchy describes the state of tension between constitutionalism and pluralism. While constitutionalism creates a certain foundation and skeleton of the structure of governance, pluralism questions the hierarchical constitutional structures and stresses the tension at the interfaces of the various legal orders. The concept of a heterarchical constitutional structure can be applied to describe those elements in between the different legal systems that allow them to function flexibly without predetermining any hierarchical relations between them. For this reason, the heterarchy of constitutional structures assumes that they are by nature communicative. They can also be described as 'soft' because they describe, rather than determine, the relationship between different legal systems. 15 In the context of relations between the EU legal order and national legal systems, the communicativeness of the heterarchic constitutional structure is noticeable in the endeavours (at least initially unilateral) to make the EU constitution (in the material sense) an integral part (also materially understood) of national constitutions. 16 At the same time, however, there are no established hierarchical interrelations between these constitutional orders. The constitutional order of the EU and the constitutional orders of the Member States appear to be parallel and complementary. 17
Constitutional courts are currently confronted with European constitutionalism, a pluralistic vision of the legal orders coexisting in Europe and their heterarchic constitutional structure. It is obvious that this contemporary image of Europe does not fit within the strictly hierarchical concept of the structure of the legal system, which is a fundamental element of the Kelsenian paradigm of control over the constitutionality of law. Thus, a question arises as to how constitutional courts relate to this new normative state.
The constitutional jurisprudence to date shows that they adopt two basic (and model) strategies of proceeding.
The first is to ignore the contemporary image of the EU legal system where the constitutional courts adopt the so-called doctrine of isolationism, closely separating constitutional problems from issues related to European integration. This allows them -at least seemingly -to maintain the status quo, and to maintain it on the classic level of relations between the constitutional law of a given country and EU law. The doctrine of isolationism has been consistently applied by the Italian CC for quite a long time. One of the concepts invented in order to maintain isolationism was the concept of so-called doubled preliminary ruling. Recently, however, this court has been gradually moving away from the position of "disregarding" EU law in judicial and constitutional matters and is becoming increasingly active in the application of European standards. At present, the example of a constitutional court which is still trying to apply the doctrine of isolationism in practice is the Hungarian Constitutional Tribunal.
The second strategy is to accept the pluralistic nature of a materially understood national constitution, which is subject to significant Europeanization. By adopting this strategy, constitutional courts are beginning to actively apply the norms of EU law as constitutional models, recognise the "EU" context in cases decided by them, and initiate a preliminary ruling procedure before the CJEU. A good illustration of such a procedure is the body of rulings of the Belgian and Austrian CCs.
It should be noted, however, that the above mentioned strategies of proceeding have the character of certain models of proceeding which will be applied to a greater or lesser extent in the jurisdiction of a particular constitutional court (and in this sense they will be model ones). Therefore, when I speak of the "isolationism" of the Italian CC, I mean the prevailing trend in jurisprudence. It is also worth noting that this means the need to refer to the assessment of the judgments of a given constitutional court and to a certain period of time (often related to the progress of integration), and to certain types of cases (e.g. related to the control of EU law or the use of this law as a model of control) and, finally, to a given organisational element of constitutional courts, consisting of several equivalent chambers or senates (e.g. German FCC). In conclusion, it can be said that, in a sense, the attribution of an isolationist or pluralist strategy to a particular constitutional court is only conventional.
A legal and comparative analysis of the judgments of constitutional courts in European matters shows the variety of forms in which constitutional courts use their powers to take into account or ignore the European context in deciding cases. The scope of a constitutional court's cognition of standards of international law, as defined by the national regulator, can, for example, be used both to actively scrutinise EU primary law as well as to evade such scrutiny. An illustration of the range of possible juridical positions is, for example, the jurisprudence of constitutional courts concerning the handling of constitutional complaints against acts of primary EU law. The "environment of competences and procedures" established by the national legislator predetermines to a certain extent the approach of a given constitutional court to the issue of the application of EU law. However, even if the regulator has adopted a rather narrow framework of cognition, the constitutional court, through its functional interpretation, may enhance it.
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It should also be stressed that isolationism will not always be tantamount to a court's negative stance on the integration process. Similarly, recognition of the pluralist and heterarchic dimension of contemporary constitutionalism will not always mean that the constitutional court fully accepts the theses of the CJEU in its jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the strategy of isolationism is based on the desire to maintain the classic paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law in its full dimension, and the opposing strategy of proceeding with respect to EU law assumes the recognition by the constitutional court of the need to accept the assumption of a constitutional heterarchy.
In this context, it is worth noting the observed tendency to move away from isolationist strategies. It turns out that this strategy is not proving effective in the long term. It often downgrades the importance of the constitutional court in the internal legal order vis-à-vis other judicial authorities which actively apply EU law and use it to undermine the role of the constitutional court as the ultimate interpreter of constitutional norms. The conflicts of competence between constitutional courts and other courts of the Member States are the best illustration of this situation.
Constitutional heterarchy is particularly evident in the multi-level system of fundamental rights protection. An analysis of the development of the EU system of human rights and its constitutionalization shows that when deciding today, the constitutional court must take into account several standards of protection and give priority to one of them, according to gradually established rules, without, however, adopting an absolute hierarchy between particular orders. This creates new legal problems in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts, linked to the above-mentioned strategies of isolationism or acceptance of constitutional heterarchy and pluralism in the area of protection of fundamental rights. The two positions of the constitutional courts are illustrated respectively by the position of the German FCC on the Antiterrorist Database Directive of 24 April 2013 18 and the ruling of the Austrian Constitutional Court of 14 March 2012 19 recognising the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter: the Charter) as the constitutional model in proceedings before the constitutional court. While the ruling of the German FCC was a response to the Åkerberg judgment 20 , interfering with the autonomy of the constitutional courts, the ruling of the Austrian CC perfectly illustrates the court's recognising the heterarchical nature of the protection of fundamental rights in contemporary Europe. The Austrian CC, on the one hand, recognised the provisions of the Charter as acceptable constitutional models, while on the other, it pointed to the different normative character of these provisions. As a result, only some of them may be regarded as acceptable constitutional models. For this reason, the Austrian CC held that a decision on the acceptability of a provision of the Charter as a constitutional model would be taken a casu ad casum. 21 At the level of decisions on the merits, it should be noted that the constitutional heterarchy requires an increasingly frequent balancing of different values and interests by the constitutional court. Hence, the principle of proportionality, which is currently one of the most influential ideas of contemporary constitutionalism, is gaining in force and acquiring a new meaning. 22 What is linked to the trend of "balancing" jurisprudence emphasizing the discourse of the current constitutional and judicial decisions, is a sort of "bargaining with the CJEU". 23 A historical analysis of constitutional court jurisprudence indicates a tendency for a national constitutional court first to present its strongest position, and then to gradually mitigate it. This is illustrated by the development of the German Solange and the Italian controlimiti doctrine, i.e. the already mentioned gradual sharpening of the procedural and material prerequisites for the admissibility of ultra vires control, or the gradual recognition of the primacy of the application of EU law over constitutional standards. The mitigation of the original position is due to various reasons. Occasionally, as in the case of the Solange doctrine, it is linked to the development of CJEU jurisprudence. In other cases, the original toughening of the theses on a given issue seems to be rather dictated by "preventive objectives". The constitutional courts accept the strongest thesis 'just in case' and its mitigation is the result of the observation of 'developments' and the established absence of a significant 'danger' from the EU side.
At the procedural and political level, the analysis of the heterarchy of contemporary structures of competence requires an indication of the already mentioned discursive character of the jurisprudence of constitutional courts. Their decisions are no longer addressed exclusively to national authorities, but -at least indirectly -also to the EU institutions.
In this context, it should also be pointed out that the number of constitutional courts which use the proceduralized form of discourse with the CJEU, i.e. references for a preliminary ruling, is on the increase. Preliminary questions of constitutional courts are evidence of the perception of the heterarchy of contem- porary constitutionalism with the division of interpretative competences characteristic for legal pluralism.
The procedural aspect of systemic heterarchy also results in the formation of a network of all the constitutional courts of the Member States. They are -at least partially -interdependent, as the decisions of the CJEU addressed to one of them all apply de facto to all (e.g. Melloni 24 ). The observed phenomenon of the so-called migration of constitutional ideas is described in turn by copying and transferring the theses expressed by one court to the jurisprudence of another constitutional court (e.g. Solange I 25 and II 26 in the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in case CC 45/09 27, or ultra vires control to which the judgment of the Czech CC in Holubec 28 case refers). Constitutional courts are inspired by and refer to the rulings of other Member States. 29 It should also be stressed that the phenomenon of constitutional heterarchy linked to the constitutionalization of the EU and the pluralism of the legal systems in force in the European legal area is a descriptive concept.
The federal aspirations within the EU in the classical sense aim to create a pure hierarchy of orders and to give the norms of EU law not only priority of application, but also primacy of enforceability. On the other hand, the concepts of a nation state are still valid, and the particular interests of an increasing number of Member States linked to different levels of economic development and their differing political power currently preclude more radical steps towards an even closer integration. 30 It is likely that the heterarchy of constitutional structures as a descriptive feature of the legal system of the EU as a whole will remain an influential concept for a long time to come. This is why the problem of how the current state of development of European constitutionalism is changing the classic paradigm of controlling the constitutionality of law is so important. 
Constitutional courts and the dogma of the superior power of the constitution
The assumption of a tiered structure of the legal system meaning its strict hierarchicality is closely related to the second element of the Kelsenian paradigm of control over the constitutionality of law, namely the assumption of the superior power of the constitution as the most important normative act within a given legal system.
The development of European integration law and Community law has perhaps struck this constitutional dogma the hardest -at least initially. The doctrine of precedence formulated in the case law of the CJEU treats national constitutions in the same way as any other act of national law and assumes that in the event of a conflict of norms which cannot be resolved through a so-called interpretation in conformity, the national body applying the law is obliged to apply the directly applicable norm of EU law and "ignore" in a given case the national law standard.
It is obvious that the doctrine of primacy overturns one of the basic assumptions of the Kelsenian paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law. It is therefore hardly surprising that the constitutional courts have for a long time defended -and in part continue to defend -the classic concept of the supremacy of the constitution. They use it primarily in the process of intra-system legitimization of controlling the constitutionality of EU law. The basic elements on which is based the thesis on the intra-system legitimation of constitutional courts to control the constitutionality of EU law are: the superior legal force of the constitution, the constitutional basis for the admissibility of transfers of powers to the EU and the ensuing need to protect the constitutionally limited scope of transfers, the sovereignty of Member States and the resulting theory of their remaining masters of the Treaties and having the obligation to ensure the constitutionally guaranteed standard of protection of fundamental rights.
The combination of the obligation of pro-EU interpretation of the Constitution with the intra-system legitimacy of controlling the constitutionality of EU law results in a number of theoretical paradoxes from the point of view of the classic paradigm of controlling the constitutionality of law. 31 sically understood control of the hierarchical conformity of norms, where the national constitution remains the point of reference. In addition, a tool for avoiding normative conflicts is often the pro-EU interpretation of the constitutions leading to silently introduced changes in the content of its norms. Thus, the standard of control is interpreted in accordance with the subject matter of control. While such an attitude is not objected to by the theorist of law in relation to the actions of other judicial authorities taking decisions according to the classic judicial model of law application, the specificity of law application by the constitutional court does lead to such paradoxes.
The evolution of rulings of constitutional courts was moving towards conditional acceptance of the principle of primacy over constitutional norms, but still most of them are considered to be competent to performing review of constitutionality of standards of EU law.
Constitutional courts must recognize the non-typical nature of EU law as a subject of control, and have therefore developed a separate arsenal of constitutional models characteristic of the review of standards of this kind. These are, above all, the prohibition on acting ultra vires and the obligation to respect constitutional identity. While the first of the above mentioned constitutional models is based on the assumption of the classically understood primacy of the constitution and the related thesis of constitutional-legal conditionality of admissibility of action of each EU body, constitutional identity is a constitutional model, which to a much greater extent adopts the assumption of the heterarchy of constitutional structures. In this case, the review of constitutionality refers only to the most important constitutional norms, which form the so-called hard core of the Basic Law of a given Member State, the amendment of which is not allowed under a given constitution.
Constitutional heterarchy also gives rise to certain derogations in the review of the constitutionality of the norms of EU law. This applies in particular to the consequences of a potential decision declaring unconstitutionality. Even if a judgment concerns directly, and not only indirectly, a standard of EU law, it will not result in the removal of the legal norm from the system, but only in the determination of its non-applicability on the territory of the state concerned.
This in turn leads to the conclusion that the classic principle of the primacy of the constitution now belongs more to the sphere of myths than that of facts. Undoubtedly, it has been subjected to significant erosion, which is why attempts are being made to reinterpret it. In reality, constitutional norms are often changed in order to adapt them to EU norms. This applies both to actions taken by the regulator prior to committing to a given legal obligation within the EU (most often before the ratification of primary law acts), as well as after accepting such an obligation (see the Polish judgment in the EAW case). Moreover, constitutional norms are often adjusted to the content of the EU norms through the so-ICLR, 2019, Vol. 19, No. 1.
called pro-EU interpretation of the constitution. Constitutional courts have not created rigid limits to the admissibility of such an interpretation. The notion of contra legem interpretation considered as the limit to the admissibility of the pro-EU interpretation of the constitution is in itself interpreted in a rather divergent way, both by different courts in similar types of cases as well as by the same court in different cases. In the latter case, the real criterion for the admissibility of a silent amendment to the constitution is the preventive or consequential nature of the review of constitutionality.
A pro-EU interpretation of the constitution, leading to its Europeanization, is a fundamental manifestation of the change in the classic meaning of the principle of the primacy of the constitution. 32 Therefore, a significant problem related to the influence of EU constitutionalization on the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary is related to the question of the essence of the pro-EU interpretation of the constitution. Constitutional courts do not use a uniform approach in this respect and usually consider pro-EU interpretation as a directive on functional or systemic interpretation. At the same time, they emphasize its distinct character (both in terms of the legitimacy of using this directive and the limits of the admissibility of its result) from the principle of indirect effect (EU-consistent interpretation) established in the case-law of the CJEU.
In the context of the observable evolution of the importance of the primacy of the constitution, the recognition of a pro-EU interpretation as a systemic interpretation accentuates the pluralism of the contemporary constitutional order in Europe. On the other hand, the inclusion of the pro-EU interpretation of the Constitution in the directives on functional interpretation emphasizes the axiological dimension of EU law in relation to the norms of national constitutions.
When considering the impact of a pro-EU interpretation of constitutional norms on the understanding of the supremacy of the constitution, it is also necessary to stress the multiplicity of subjects, characteristic of European constitutionalism, interpreting constitutional norms (national and EU). When applying a pro-EU interpretation of the norms of the constitution, constitutional courts sometimes have to answer the question of whether it is necessary to initiate a preliminary ruling procedure in a given case. This can often mean a pragmatic choice of a particular judicial strategy. The absence of a reference for a preliminary ruling allows the constitutional court to leave for itself interpretative autonomy. However, by initiating the preliminary ruling procedure, it restricts to a large extent its own freedom of interpretation. Simultaneously, however, it may shift the burden of responsibility for a particular decision to another judi- Law, 2015, vol. 35, pp. 194-195. cial authority, i.e. the CJEU. Of course, from the perspective of the body of rulings of the CJEU, the rules of conduct are clear. The interpretation of EU law is the exclusive competence of the CJEU. Nevertheless, the analysis of the judicial practice of constitutional courts points to cases of omissions in this respect commented on in the doctrine (e.g. of the German FCC in the Maastricht case).
In conclusion, the progressive Europeanization of constitutional norms nonetheless entails the risk of divergent interpretations of EU norms at the EU and the national level. By aligning the constitution with EU law, constitutional courts can also partially align EU law with the constitution. Thus, although the importance of the principle of the primacy of the constitution has significantly evolved over the past decades, it is still -in its amended form -the primary point of reference for constitutional courts in determining their political role.
Constitutional courts and partial decentralization of control of the hierarchical conformity of norms
The partial decentralization of control of the hierarchical conformity of norms, which stems from the 'Community mandate' granted to national courts in the Simmenthal II judgment, now represents a change in the classic paradigm of constitutional control, which strikes most severely at the position of constitutional courts in the political system.
The heterarchy of the legal system and the related evolution of the importance of constitutional supremacy primarily affect the constitutional court's relations with the EU institutions. By contrast, the decentralization of constitutional control means that constitutional courts lose their hitherto unique position within the national order and begin to be treated in the same way as any other national court. 33 As far as the application of EU law is concerned, according to the CJEU, they are becoming one of many rather than one of a kind. Such far-reaching interference in the classic position of the constitutional court as the supreme guardian of systemic coherence creates many hot spots in the national judicial system and, as evidenced by the analysis of rulings contained in the second chapter of the paper, often leads to conflicts of competence between the constitutional court and other judicial authorities of the Member State concerned.
The 'fight between courts' , where the argument of the 'Community mandate' of national courts is used, as observed in the constitutional practice, concerns issues such as the temporal aspect of a ruling of the constitutional court (Filipiak 34 , Winner-Wetten 35 ), the primacy of constitutional review before the CJEU (Melki i Abdeli 36 ), as well as in intra-system ambitional 'games' between the highest courts of a Member State's judiciary (Landtová 37 , Aliyev 38 ).
The displacement of constitutional courts from their traditional political position should be combined with a broader trend of the so-called atomization of national hierarchies of the judiciary. When describing this phenomenon, M.
Bobek compares the current image of the European judiciary to the vision of a loose set of disorderly moving atoms (de-hierarchized national courts) with the CJEU, which is the only one to retain a strong position and stand at the centre of the entire structure. 39 He points out that the perceptible atomization of the national (including constitutional) judicial structure is the result of the decisions of the CJEU in recent years concerning the use of the preliminary ruling procedure by the courts of lower instances. 40 The rulings of the CJEU in such cases as CARTESIO 41, Elchinov 42 and Križan 43 , Kücükdeveci 44 have strengthened the right of national lower courts to initiate the preliminary ruling procedure, without first seeking to clarify legal uncertainties within the state judicial system or even ignoring the decision of a higher court. 45 The atomization of the judiciary has the effect of decreasing the binding of the lower national court with the decisions of the higher national courts in the jurisdictional structure of the judiciary when the case concerns the application of EU law standards. However, this observed judicial trend is not based on deeper institutional changes. From the point of view of the classic paradigm of the constitutional judiciary, the atomization of the national judicial power structure is particularly dangerous. As already mentioned, it deprives the constitutional courts of the only (and in this sense unique) body entitled to control the hierarchical conformity of norms. Moreover, the process of atomization (or restructuring) of national courts makes it possible not only to partially decentralize the control over the constitutionality of the law (bypassing the constitutional court in the process of resolving a given legal problem, which is of course an aftermath of the Simmenthal II ruling), but also to challenge the final decision of this court if the lower court considers it incompatible with EU law (the Križan doctrine). It is therefore hardly surprising that at least some constitutional courts feel left outside the scope of the integration project. Specifically, the decentralization of constitutional control combined with the atomization of the structure of the national judiciary leads to the marginalization of the role of constitutional courts and their slow atrophy. On the grounds of the current jurisdictional line of the CJEU, constitutional courts gain nothing (as opposed to all other elements of the national judicial authority), but only lose. 47 While the constitutional heterarchy and the changed status of national constitutions have been conceptually "digested" by the constitutional courts, at least in part, and in a way incorporated into the current picture of constitutional control of the law, thus far there has not been sufficient conceptualization of the decentralization of control. There is currently no satisfactory theoretical model describing and standardising the relations between the various national courts, the constitutional court, and the CJEU in connection with the Community mandate of the state courts. First of all, there is no internal systemic justification for such a qualitative shift in the political position of the constitutional court, as introduced by the CJEU in its rulings. 48 Therefore, many courts try to protect their uniqueness, inter alia, through the doctrine of isolationism, i.e. ignoring the issue of the application of European law in judicial and constitutional matters. Komárek points out, the CJEU has hitherto not made too much use of questions referred for a preliminary ruling by national courts for the purposes of the real depreciation of constitutional courts within the framework of the national system of control over the constitutionality of law, cf. KOMÁREK, Jan, The place of constitutional courts in the EU. European Constitutional Law Review, 2013, vol. 9 issue 3, p. 430.
However, this position is gradually becoming less effective, precisely because of the sharp increase in the number of references for a preliminary ruling, in which national courts have begun to challenge the national structure of application of the Constitution. 49 This is why constitutional courts are beginning to be differently involved in the European constitutional discourse. 50 One way of partially hindering (or mitigating the effects of) the decentralization of hierarchical conformity of standards is the practice of recognizing the admissibility of referring to EU standards as standards for review. 51 As a result, on the one hand, constitutional courts are beginning to actively apply EU law, but on the other hand they do so in a specific, constitutional way and with the erga omnes effect of a ruling that is characteristic of constitutional control. It is worth stressing that this judicial practice may take two forms. Firstly, it is acceptable to refer to EU law as a direct standard of review in proceedings before constitutional courts. 52 Secondly, there is a more widespread practice of controlling the compatibility of national law with EU law through a strictly constitutional standard (usually a direct integration provision constituting the basis for transferring competences in favour of the EU or opening up of the national system to the enforcement and application of EU law). 53 In the latter case, the EU standard will serve as an intermediate model. In any case, by allowing for a review of the conformity of national standards with EU standards in constitutional and judicial proceedings, the constitutional court partially suppresses the depreciation of its status within the national legal order.
Another strategy is the recognition of EU law norms as constitutional norms (in the context of the Charter), as applied in the case law of the Austrian Con-stitutional Court (the aforementioned judgment of 14 March 2012) . Such an approach is the result of many factors, including Austria's specific system of sources of law. It may seem that in such a case the constitutional court loses significant control over a certain scope of its cognition, since -by implication -it makes decisions dependent on the interpretative decisions of the CJEU, and on such an important issue as setting constitutionally guaranteed standards of protection of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the above mentioned decision of the Austrian CC is interpreted by many as a step in the opposite direction, namely to stop the decentralization of the protection of fundamental rights in the national legal order.
Another sign of active participation in the European constitutional discourse is the initiation of the preliminary ruling procedure by the constitutional courts. On the one hand, this means recognising its status as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, i.e. as one of many other national courts or tribunals. On the other hand, however, questions referred for a preliminary ruling by constitutional courts may be of the nature of a deliberate strategy to stop action by other national courts which seek to undermine the position of the national guardian of the constitution. This approach is illustrated, for example, by the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court in the Melloni case. 54 On the other hand, the first question referred by the German FCC shows that constitutional courts are beginning to enter into an open and direct discourse with the CJEU, without assuming the role of a "petitioner" seeking interpretative advice, but dictating with authority the conditions for further cooperation and putting forward a specific ultimatum.
As J. Komárek points out, decentralization of control over the constitutionality of the law has the potential to play an even more serious role in transforming the status of constitutional courts owing to the relatively recent 'fundamental rights revolution' . 55 Following the entry into force of the Charter in December 2009, there has been a significant increase in the number of preliminary questions from national courts on fundamental rights protection issues. It is therefore a symptom of a true decentralization of constitutional control with regard to the setting of standards for the protection of fundamental rights which are binding in a given Member State. 56 At the same time, this means strong interference in the position of national human rights tribunals, which the constitutional courts pursued to achieve over a long period of time.
Another scenario in this respect is envisaged by M. Bobek, who sees an opportunity to strengthen the role of national courts in the EU's accession to the ECHR. As indicated above, the so-called fundamental rights revolution in the EU has, at least for the time being, decentralized the control of constitutionality in terms of conformity with fundamental rights and has further weakened the status of the constitutional court. The EU's accession to the ECHR (which is questionable after the opinion of the CJ of 18 December 2014) has the potential to change this state of affairs. In the conventional system, constitutional courts have their traditional role guaranteed and their status remains unchanged. In countries with centralized control over the constitutionality of the law, they often remain the last instance before referring the case to Strasbourg. They also often have a significant impact on the implementation of the ECtHR's decision. 57 If the EU joins the ECHR, the role of constitutional courts in the protection of fundamental rights may be reinforced once again. These courts will not only be the last instance to challenge a national legal problem before the ECtHR, but they may also again become the "last point of review" in the national system in cases involving violations of the ECHR resulting from EU rules. 58 Potentially, the role of constitutional courts in the protection of fundamental rights is also likely to be strengthened by Protocol 16 to the ECHR, which provides an opportunity for the highest national courts and tribunals (including constitutional courts) to address the ECtHR with questions concerning the interpretation of the ECHR. 59 As M.
Bobek points out, constitutional courts may use this procedure to put the CJEU in a similar situation to the one in which they have been placed by the CJEU for years, i.e. eliminate them from participating in the resolution of a legal problem. This will happen if constitutional courts begin to address questions concerning 57 The CJEU stated in it that: "Protocol No 16 to the ECHR (....) authorizes the supreme courts of the Member States to request an advisory opinion from the ECtHR on fundamental questions concerning the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR or its Protocols. Given that, in the event of accession, the ECHR will form an integral part of Union law, the mechanism established by this Protocol could undermine the autonomy and effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure established by the TFEU, especially when the rights guaranteed by the Charter correspond to the rights recognized by the ECHR. In fact, it is not excluded that a request for an advisory opinion submitted by a national court under Protocol No 16 may initiate the so-called <<<earlier involvement>> procedure of the CJEU, thus creating a risk of circumventing the preliminary ruling procedure." According to the CJEU, the draft accession agreement does not stipulate any provisions with regard to the relationship between the two mechanisms.
the interpretation of the ECHR in cases with an EU context, disregarding the CJEU. 60
Considering the issue of forecasts concerning further evolution of the role of constitutional courts in the EU as a separate problem, it should be stated that the decentralization of control over the constitutionality of law has resulted in the removal of constitutional courts from the pedestal of the highest guardian of systemic coherence. From their point of view, this means a significant political shift. However, this considerable change is not reflected in deeper institutional reforms (both within the EU and the Member States). There is also no satisfactory theoretical justification for equating constitutional courts with other national courts.
At present we may observe a certain activism on the part of the constitutional courts in applying the norms of EU law. It certainly also aims to 're-enter the game' and mark its place in the European judicial power structure. Constitutional courts are trying to defend their unique position, which is characteristic of Kelsen's paradigm of control over the constitutionality of law, by 'taking over the reins' from national courts and reviewing the compatibility of national law with EU law, or by using the preliminary ruling procedure. Paradoxically, it can be said that they use procedural and jurisdictional tools designed to demonstrate their equivalence with other national courts in order to defend their exceptional status.
The erga omnes effect of the rulings of constitutional courts and its progressive erosion.
The last element of the classic paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law is the erga omnes effect of constitutional court rulings. It has also undergone change along with the partial decentralization of the hierarchical control of norms. A decision of a national court declaring EU law incompatible with national law -in accordance with the principle of primacy and direct effect -does not eliminate a national norm from the system (its judicial derogation), but only its non-applicability to a particular case. Therefore, such a decision should be attributed the inter partes effect. However, this simple consequence of the Simmenthal II doctrine causes some complications in connection with the traditional approach to controlling the constitutionality of the law. First and foremost, there may be inconsistencies between the decision of the national court and the decision of the constitutional court. It may happen that the same legal problem (the question of the conformity of a given national rule with EU law) will be resolved differently by the national court and the constitutional court. There are two options: either the constitutional court finds that a national rule is not in conformity with an EU law norm considered to be a direct or indirect standard of control, while the national court sees no such collision, or vice versa, the constitutional court's decision has the character of an affirmative judgment and the national court applies EU law, instead of a national rule. Of course, such situations are unacceptable from the perspective of the classic paradigm of constitutional justice. According to the Kelsenian tradition, it is the constitutional court that is the ultimate verifier of systemic cohesion which by stating the lack of hierarchical consistency between norms, removes the unconstitutional norm from the system. By adopting this classic perspective, constitutional courts try to avoid the possibility of the situations indicated above. First of all, they adopt the already discussed strategy of isolationism, and thus separate themselves from the application of EU law, typically invoking the principle of systemic autonomy of EU law. However, as has been said, in the current circumstances, the doctrine of isolationism is not yielding satisfactory results and leads to the marginalization of the role of constitutional courts in the European judicial system. Therefore, at least in part, constitutional courts are beginning to apply EU law. But then the problem resurfaces. An example is the doppio binario ("double track") idea, resulting from the Italian CC's case law which separates conceptually abstract control from that initiated by a legal question. The said CC, recognising that it can only control the conformity of national law with EU law in via principale (and not in via incidentale), caused the conflicts between a national standard and an EU standard to have begun to be dealt with following a two-track approach. The first track led to the non-application of a national standard in conflict with EU law by a national court and the issuing of a judgment on the basis of a directly effective provision of EU law (the non applicazione concept).
On the other hand, the second track was launched by the State or regions in the form of an abstract control over the constitutionality of the law and led to a decision by the CC. This meant that the same national law could be inapplicable (in a specific case) and still valid according to the non applicazione concept (inter partes effect) and, on the other hand, unconstitutional and needing to be removed from the legal order (erga omnes effect). Therefore, the consequences of the incompatibility of a national rule with EU law depended in Italy on whether it was applied by a national court or challenged under Article 127 of the constitution before the CC. In order, inter alia, to avoid such situations (indirectly undermining the authority of the constitutional court), the Italian CC decided to change its position on the use of the preliminary ruling procedure and, in 2013, for the first time presented a preliminary ruling question on a case initiated under the specific control procedure. 61 This ruling has the potential to reverse the doctrine of a double preliminary ruling, according to which a national court, before exercising constitutional control over a case in an EU context, was obliged to launch a preliminary ruling procedure before the CJEU. This doctrine, designed to leave the CC's 'right of the last word' , in practice started to be used to bypass 61 Decision of the CC of 18 July 2013 July ref. 207/2013 constitutionality review by the national courts. 62 The abandonment of the doctrine of double preliminary ruling may contribute to strengthening the position of the constitutional court and the erga omnes effect of a ruling on the incompatibility of national law with EU law, but will not resolve the problem altogether. This is owing to the recent judgments of the CJEU, in particular in the Melki and Abdeli case. This decision was decisive for the inadmissibility of the adoption of a doctrine of full prioritization of constitutional control over the Community's (EU) preliminary ruling. A national court will always have the right to address a question to the CJEU first and, for reasons of procedural economy alone, it is likely that it will avoid another preliminary ruling procedure before the constitutional court. Constitutional courts now have to accept the fact that the decentralization of control of the hierarchical conformity of norms entails the decomposition of another element of the Kelsen paradigm, namely the erga omnes effect of the ruling.
The CJEU ruling in the Križan case, in turn, made the erga omnes effect relativized in cases where the national court applies EU law. The CJEU has made it clear that a decision of a constitutional court is not binding on a national court if, in its view, it is incompatible with EU law. The CJEU has decided that a national court may, on its own motion, make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, although it decides on a reference following the annulment of its first ruling by way of cassation by the constitutional court of the Member State concerned, and the national provision requires it to settle the dispute in accordance with the legal opinion expressed by that court. In practice, this applies to situations where the constitutional court issues an affirmative judgment on the conformity of national law with EU law (treated as a direct or indirect standard of control) and the national court is convinced of non-conformity in this regard. Relativization also concerns the temporal negative effect of a ruling of a constitutional court, if it is a settlement with deferred expiry of an unconstitutional provision in force. In the Filipiak and Winner-Wetten judgments the CJEU found that also in these cases the decision of the constitutional court is not binding on the national court and without waiting for the expiry of the deferral period the national court may refuse to apply a national standard that is unconstitutional and incompatible with EU law.
To sum up, it should be stated that the change in the classic paradigm of constitutional review consisting in the relativization of the effects of the decisions of constitutional courts severely hits their current status as the highest guardians of systemic coherence. This change, based on the principle of interconnected vessels, is the result of the decentralization of the hierarchical control over the conformity of norms. judgments, the CJEU has pushed the systemic consequences of the decentralization of constitutional control considerably further. The Community mandate of national courts may be an argument legitimizing a lack of respect for the decisions of constitutional courts. The principle of systemic autonomy of EU law, and the thesis on the separation of fields of cognition of the constitutional judiciary and the CJEU, also referred to in the constitutional case-law, may be regarded as a theoretical concept justifying such a relativization of the erga omnes effect of constitutional court rulings. However, this concept is currently being turned against constitutional courts and leads to the marginalization of their role. National courts may, on the basis of the developed case law of the CJEU, completely disregard the constitutional judiciary in cases where the constitutional context is connected with the EU context.
Decomposition of the classic model of control over the constitutionality of law and the prospective status of constitutional courts in the EU.
The analysis of changes in the centralized model of constitutional review resulting from a state's membership of the EU unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the "great accession" of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional review, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become "only ones of many" national courts. This trend does not stem exclusively from the judgments of the CJEU. To a large extent, the theses from the Luxembourg judgments are exploited (or even abused) by other national courts, including the highest courts.
Constitutional courts recognise these significant changes and are beginning to be more actively involved in the European constitutional discourse. Examples of the evolution of their position in relation to EU law are, for example, the recent preliminary ruling questions of constitutional courts, which for a long time did not recognise their status as a court within the meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU. Moreover, abandoning full 'isolationism' consists in recognising the admissibility of invoking EU law as a model of control (direct or indirect).
Constitutional courts also mark their presence (and unique status) in national systems by sharpening the judicial theses concerning the limits of Europeanisation of the constitution. As examples of such a judicial policy, one can mention the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the German FCC in the Gauweiler 63 case and by the Italian CC in the M.A.S.&M.B. case (Taricco II) 64, in which these courts once again refer to legal concepts related to the so-called hard core of the constitution (constitutional identity, controlimiti). Despite the CJEU's often consensual attitude (in Taricco II 65, particularly when compared to the CJEU judgment in the Gauweiler 66 case), the judicial reactions of constitutional courts to the judgments of the CJEU in such cases prove how difficult constitutional pluralism turns out to be in practice. 67 The concept of constitutional identity, which is becoming the "last bastion" of the constitution's supremacy in the classical sense, can be treated as the absolute limit (on the basis of a given fundamental law) for Europeanization of the constitution. On the other hand, the ban on acting ultra vires is a boundary of a relative nature -it concerns rights transferred on the basis of a given international agreement. The latter model of control -characteristic of the review of the norms of EU law -is beginning to be used by constitutional courts (not necessarily correctly) in cases concerning intra-system conflicts (vide Landtová and Holubec), as well as in relation to the activities of EU institutions other than the CJEU (see the first reference for a preliminary ruling by the German FCC).
Thus, the current situation of the constitutional judiciary in the EU under the model of centralised control of constitutionality is complicated. On the one hand, constitutional courts are marginalised by being equated with other judicial authorities of the Member States, while on the other hand, by abandoning the strategy of isolationism, they are beginning to defend their unique constitutional position. It should be remembered that the 20th century is often referred to as the age of constitutional justice. Constitutional courts in the last century, or at least in the second half of the century, gained a lot, by strengthening their political position and acquiring additional competences. Not only have they become guardians of systemic coherence, but also national human rights tribunals, electoral courts, controllers of political parties, arbitrators in disputes between state authorities, or individuals and the state and its constituent parts (regions, provinces in federal states). European integration is the first important political and legal phenomenon to change this trend, at least in part. As some constitutional courts claim, they are the greatest losers of the integration process. 68 This cannot be denied when looking at the balance of profits and losses of the constitutional courts and other national courts. However, this does not mean that the tendency to marginalize the role of constitutional courts vis-à-vis other judicial authorities in the Member States has made them weak at present.
The constitutional courts of the Member States continue to play a fundamental role in a country's participation in the integration process. Moreover, in view of the general increase in the importance of the constitutional judiciary in Europe in the second half of the 20th century, the constitutional courts also make use of other "acquired" functions to set the conditions for a country's membership of the EU. Nowadays, in the context of European integration, constitutional courts not only play the role of guardian of the coherence of the system. They also address, directly or indirectly, the problems of EU membership by performing the aforementioned functions of national human rights tribunals, electoral courts, controllers of political parties, or guardians of the interests of the federal and regional components of states, and guardians of institutional balance. 69
In conclusion, it can be said that the classic (Kelsenian) paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law has undergone a profound transformation over the last few decades. It is impossible to return to the past with a very clear and relatively simple concept of the role of the constitutional court in the political system of the state. In the current state of development of European integration, this role is much more complicated, as are the competence and procedural relations in which constitutional courts exist. Moreover, to a large extent, the further evolution of the model of control over the constitutionality of the law in connection with the process of European integration will be achieved through judicial decisions (both of the CJEU and of the constitutional and other national courts). It will therefore become increasingly difficult to conceptualize and frame it theoretically.
One thing is certain. The constitutional courts of the Member States from the time of the Frontini and Solange I judgments and as of today are divided by the enormous 'jurisdiction gap' created jointly by the CJEU and the national courts. Judgments of recent years, such as in the Melki and Abdeli, Filipiak, Križan or Melloni and Åkerberg cases prove that both procedural and competence-related issues connected with the role of constitutional courts in the EU are largely normative and regulated by the case law of the CJEU. Moreover, such normativization is based on certain general principles and created jurisprudential exceptions, which often require further refinement. The jurisdictional and procedural framework within which constitutional courts operate in the European judicial 2014, vol. 10, issue 1, p. 154. At the same time, the author juxtaposes the status of constitutional courts in the integration process with the "biggest winners" of the EU project -national parliaments. forum is therefore established on a progressive basis, and is dynamic and, at least for the time being, undefined. This gives constitutional courts considerable freedom in their co-development. It seems that the growing awareness of this fact makes them more and more active in applying EU law and using the preliminary ruling procedure. Despite significant differences in the case-law of the European constitutional courts in the individual Member States, this trend is prevalent. It should be viewed positively, as constitutional courts should seize the opportunity to contribute to the reshaping of the model of review of the constitutionality of the law, which takes into account the pluralism of legal orders and the Community mandate of all national courts.
What is the future of constitutional courts in the EU?
Certainly, when analysing this issue, one should go beyond the thinking pattern of the jurisprudence of the so-called constitutional conflicts 70 and the pragmatic-realistic theory of constitutional judiciary, which reduces their decisions in European matters to the struggle for power and prestige. 71 Both the CJEU and the constitutional courts should care about the cooperative development of European constitutionalism. 72 Undoubtedly, there is and should be room in the EU for a strong role of constitutional courts. Therefore, it is necessary to critically assess the current tendency to marginalize their role in the case law of the CJEU in relation to other judicial authorities. 73 The CJEU should be more aware of the exceptional nature of constitutional courts. On the other hand, constitutional courts can no longer resort to isolationist strategies. These strategies lead to their marginalization in the application of EU law, which in turn results in their losing the necessary control over systemic coherence.
However, the pluralistic concept of the European legal order, which is being shaped today, requires that the jurisprudence of constitutional courts adapts to the changing paradigm of control over the constitutionality of the law. This is not an easy task. Constitutional courts must find the right balance between isolation based on the assumption of autonomy of both types of legal systems (EU and national) and an overly open attitude towards EU law, linked to the practical permeation of EU law into national systems. The basic guideline should be 70 The expression used by M. Kumm the assumption of complementarity, but not interchangeability of national legal systems and EU law. 74 Constitutional courts are not in a position to avoid the application of EU law norms (in the process of interpreting the constitution as a direct constitutional review or as a subject of control), but they cannot forget about the systemic separation of these norms from constitutional standards.
